Phenomenologists have always been concerned with the relationships between their methods and the life that sustains and instructs them, and which are, in turn, instructed by it. In its most general form, it is a question of relationships between philosophy and non-philosophy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceives of these connections in terms of a reversible inside-outside dynamic from at least Phenomenology of Perception to his unpublished manuscripts. No philosopher better illustrates this dialectic of life and ideas than Michel de Montaigne, whose life (...) and work are the subject of “Reading Montaigne” in Signs. This paper consists of a critical analysis of that essay, and thus forms a meta-inside/outside relationship in reading Merleau-Ponty reading his predecessor. The essay examines, among other things, how Montaigne’s writing provides an instructive example of the intertwining of life and ideas as Merleau-Ponty understood it as well as a puzzle about why he did not connect “Reading Montaigne” with the two chapters of Signs that concern language. (shrink)

Exploration of Alfred North Whitehead's influence on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature.

by Wolfe Mays It is a great pleasure and honour to write this preface. I first became ac quainted with Herbert Spiegelberg's work some twenty years ago, when in 1960 I reviewed The Phenomenological Movement! for Philosophical Books, one of the few journals in Britain that reviewed this book, which Herbert has jok ingly referred to as "the monster". I was at that time already interested in Con tinental thought, and in particular phenomenology. I had attended a course on phenomenology (...) given by Rene Schaerer at Geneva when I was working there in 1955-6. I had also been partly instrumental in getting Merleau-Ponty to come to Manchester in 1958. During his visit he gave a seminar in English on politics and a lecture in French on "Wittgenstein and Language" in which he attacked Wittgenstein's views on language in the Tractatus. He was apparently unaware of the Philosophical Investigations. But it was not until I came to review Herbert's book that I appreciated the ramifications of the movement: its diverse strands of thought, and the manifold personalities involved in it. For example, Herbert mentions one Aurel Kolnai who had written on the "Phenomenology of Disgust'!, and which had appeared in Vol. 10 of Husserl's Jahrbuch. It was only after I had been acquainted for some time with Kolnai then in England, that I realised that 2 Herbert had written about him in the Movement. The Movement itself contains a wealth of learning. (shrink)

The following pages attempt to develop the main outlines of an existential phenomenology of law within the context of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phe nomenology of the social world. In so doing, the essay addresses the rather narrow scholarly question, If Merleau-Ponty had written a phenomenology of law, what would it have looked like? But this scholarly enterprise, although impeccable in itself, is also transcended by a more complicated concern for a very different sort of question. Namely, if Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological descriptions of (...) the social world are correct-as I believe they largely are-then what are the philosophical consequences for an adequate understanding of law? Such a project may well occasion a certain surprise amongst observers of the contemporary philosophical landscape, at least in what concerns the terrain of continental thought, and for two different reasons. The first is that, although interest in Merleau-Ponty's work remains strong in the· United States and Can ada, his philosophical standing in his own country has been largely eclipsed! by that of, first, his friend/estranged acquaintance, Jean-Paul Sartre; by various Marxist philosophies and critical social theories; and finally by those doing her meneutics of language. In my view, current neglect of Merleau-Ponty's thought in France is most regrettable. (shrink)

Suki is an exciting, yet demanding, program for teaching children how to make the transition from speaking to writing, to encourage them to develop a poetic sensitivity and an appreciation for some main themes in the philosophy of art and even metaphysics. In what follows, I would like to indicate some of the reasons I find the program exciting - besides the fact that it can be successful in accomplishing its objectives - as well as some reasons for believing it (...) difficult to teach - indeed, I believe it is the most difficult in the series of readings published by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children. (shrink)

This essay discusses the role that creativity played in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and the lived-body as well as in his phenomenology of the social world-- mainly through language. The author identifies three main examples of the philosophical importance that creativity had for Merleau-Ponty: (1) the origin of meaning, (2) the rejection of the Cartesian mind-body dualism, and (3) necessary conditions for human dignity in the relationship of culture and nature. Finally, the last of these examples and the significance (...) of creativity are considered in the light of Merleau-Ponty's last, unfinished work, "The Visible and the Invisible". (shrink)

A comprehensive account of human kindness.

Connects the work of Merleau-Ponty to environmental studies.

Heidegger's totally objective view of aesthetic truth, That the meaning of aesthetic experience is revealed only in and through the art-Object, Fails to appreciate the contributions of subjectivity to that meaningfulness. This is shown by pointing out that interpretation of an artwork can be relevant for our aesthetic appreciation and that sometimes subjective factors such as the artist's intentions, And the viewer's personal, Cultural background, Are relevant to interpretation.

This paper interprets and extends Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished ontology of flesh in order finally to settle accounts with the Cartesian legacy that has hungover Western metaphysics for the last three centuries. The essay does this by advancing Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of two closely intertwined topics—the relationship of consciousness and Nature and the meaningfulness of Nature itself. Among other things, the essay seeks to explain the emergence of consciousness from Nature and defends a view of consciousness as the mobilization of the powers (...) of corporeity—including intercorporeity—to investigate, articulate, and creatively adumbrate Nature and Being as such. It does so by responding to natural resonances and rhythms, through intensities of feeling andthe perception of possibilities. (shrink)

Summary In 1979, Robert C. Olby published an article titled ?Mendel no Mendelian??, in which he questioned commonly held views that Gregor Mendel (1822?1884) laid the foundations for modern genetics. According to Olby, and other historians of science who have since followed him, Mendel worked within the tradition of so-called hybridists, who were interested in the evolutionary role of hybrids rather than in laws of inheritance. We propose instead to view the hybridist tradition as an experimental programme characterized by a (...) dynamic development that inadvertently led to a focus on the inheritance of individual traits. Through a careful analysis of publications on hybridization by Carl Linnaeus (1707?1778), Joseph Gottlieb Koelreuter (1733?1806), Carl Friedrich Gärtner (1772?1850), and finally Mendel himself, we will show that this development consisted in repeated reclassifications of hybrids to accommodate anomalies, which in the end allowed Mendel to draw analogies between whole organisms, individual traits, and ?elements? contained in reproductive cells. Mendel's achievement was a product of normal science, and yet a revolutionary step forward. This also explains why, in 1900, when the report he gave on his experiments was ?rediscovered?, Mendel could be read as a ?Mendelian? (shrink)